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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 602: Court permits consolidation of tripartite arbitrations.
Since arbitration is no longer deemed a special proceeding,3 8 it
was speculated that courts would refuse to extend the benefits of CPLR
602, which permits the consolidation of actions involving a common
question of law or fact, thereto. 39 Nevertheless, in Chariot Textiles
Corp. v. Wannalancit Textile Corp.,40 the Court of Appeals adopted
the viewpoint that the application to consolidate transmutes the arbi-
trations into special proceedings which, then, could be consolidated.
Recendy, the question arose as to whether tripartite arbitrations could
also be consolidated.
In Vigo Steamship Corp. v. Marship Corp.,41 Vigo Corp. (Vigo) had
leased a ship owned by Marship Corp. (Marship) and subleased it to
Frederick Snare Corp. (Snare). During a voyage by the latter, the ship
was damaged and separate arbitration proceedings ensued between
Marship and Vigo, and Vigo and Snare. Recognizing that common
questions of law and fact were involved, the Court of Appeals ordered
that the arbitrations be consolidated.
It should be emphasized that this decision could not have been
reached were it not for the ingenuity of Vigo's counsel. For, in tripartite
arbitration, each party nominates one arbitrator who in turn selects a
third. Thus, under ordinary circumstances, consolidation would be de-
finitionally impossible since four rather than three arbitrators would be
chosen. However, counsel for Vigo overcame this obstacle by agreeing
to abide by Marship's selection of an arbitrator, thereby preserving the
structure of the three-man board: two partial arbitrators and a neutral
one.
CPLR 1007: Impleader allowed despite allegations of active negli-
gence in complaint where bill of particulars indicates that defendant
was only passively negligent.
One area in which the CPLR is particularly fraught with sub-
stantive rather than procedural problems is that of third-party prac-
tice.42 For, the right to institute a third-party action under CPLR
1007 is contingent upon the obligation of the third-party defendant
to indemnify the named defendant. 43 This, in turn, often hinges on
a determination of whether the defendant's alleged negligence was
38 Compare CPA 1459 with CPLR 7502.
39 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7502, supp. commentary at 117 (1964); 8 WK&M 7502.04.
40 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913, 275 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1962).
41 26 N.Y.2d 157, 257 N.E.2d 624, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1970).
42 See 2 WK&M 1007.02.
43 Putvin v, Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
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active or passive. Generally, the third-party complaint will be allowed
at the pleading stage, so long as "the original complaint can rea-
sonably be interpreted as including an allegation of passive negligence
on the part of the defendant."44 But, what is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the complaint? Could it include a consideration of
extraneous matters? The Appellate Division, Third Department, held,
in Molino v. Tougher Heating & Plumbing Co.,45 that where the orig-
inal complaint did not allege passive negligence, it was immaterial that
the bill of particulars might indicate that such negligence was nonethe-
less present. The Molino court reasoned that "a bill [of particulars]
may not supply an essential allegation which is lacking in the plead-
ing"46; it may only "amplify" to the extent that it particularizes a gen-
eral allegation.47
An opposite position was taken by the First Department in
Torres v. Transamerican Freight Line, Inc.48 There, the court denied a
motion to dismiss a third-party complaint on the basis that "while
the original complaint alleges what appears to be active negligence,
the bill of particulars gives dear indication that what may be proved
will be passive." 49
This holding seems contra to the Court of Appeals decision in
Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co., o wherein it was reasoned:
True, if there is a variance between proof and pleadings, plaintiffs
may move to conform the pleadings to the proof. The question
here, [the character of the negligence for purposes of third-party
practice] however, relates to the pleadings only.5'
Nevertheless, the outcome in Torres is more in keeping with the in-
tent of CPLR 1007 "to avoid circuity and multiplicity of law suits
and to encourage the expeditious determination of all claims . . . "52
and is most compelling when viewed in light of the liberal reading
to which a third-party complaint is entitled at the pleading stage.0
44 Id. at 455, 158 NE.2d at 695, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 21. See also 2 WK&M 1007.02;
Koerner, Modern Third-Party Practice -Substantive or Procedural, 3 N.Y.L.F. 159, 163
(1957); Comment, Indemnity Among Joint Tort-Feasors in New York; Active and Passive
Negligence and Impleader, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 782, 798-801 (1959).
45 23 App. Div. 2d 616, 256 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d Dep't 1965).
46 Id. at 617, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
47Id., 256 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
48 34 App. Div. 2d 538, 308 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1970).
49 Id., 308 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
505 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
5l Id. at 459, 158 N.E.2d at 698, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
52 Morey v. Seabright Co., 41 Misc. 2d 1068, 1070, 274 N.Y.S.2d 206, 309 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1964).
53 Braun v. City of New York, 17 App. Div. 2d 264, 268, 234 N.YS.2d 935, 939 (1st
Dep't 1962).
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